Research

Working Papers:

Tenure, Accountability and Electoral Selection, working paper here

This paper investigates the impact of a 2014 reform that extended term limits for mayors of Italian towns with population under 3,000 residents, transitioning from two to three consecutive terms. Exploiting the fact that the reform was not anticipated by incumbent second-term mayors, I estimate separately three main channels through which this policy shift may have impacted local government performance: mayors’ tenure, electoral accountability, and electoral selection. My results indicate that the overall effect of the reform on voters’ welfare was negative. In particular, I uncover a negative tenure effects in the speed of payments in investment spending and in the supply of general administrative service. Specifically, third-term mayors exhibit a decline in performance compared to their second-term. A possible explanation for this performance drop is a decrease in motivation that arise during the concluding stretch of extended tenures as mayor of a small municipality. In such contexts, the mayor’s job tend to become repetitive and less engaging over time. My findings can be of relevance for policymakers contemplating similar reforms for small subnational local governments.

EUI  Working  Group, CSEF Lunch Seminar, SIEP conference Cagliari 2024, SIE conference L'Aquila 2024, Bank of Italy Florence.

The Great War, Fertility and Female Labor Force Participation: Evidence from Italy ,  with Marco Cozzani and Francesco Colombo. 
VisitINPS project. Recent slides here

This paper examines the long-term effects of World War I on female labor force participation (LFP) and fertility in Italy. We exploit variation in military casualties

across Italian districts to identify how wartime demographic shocks affected women’s economic and demographic behavior. Our analysis distinguishes between two types

of military mortality: combat deaths, which disproportionately affected soldiers from lower socioeconomic backgrounds, and illness-related deaths (primarily from the 1918

Spanish influenza), which were less socially selective. Using digitized census data from 1911–1931 and administrative records from the Italian National Institute of Social Security (INPS), we document three main findings. First, in the short run (1921–1931), districts more exposed to illness-related deaths experienced increased female employment in skilled sectors, particularly administrative services and retail. Second, these same districts exhibited persistent fertility declines that widened over subsequent decades. Third, women born in more exposed areas—especially in Central and Southern Italy during the 1920s and early 1930s—were significantly more likely to participate in the labor force throughout their lifetimes, as measured by pension eligibility. Our results suggest that the composition of male mortality matters: the removal of relatively more educated men through illness created opportunities for women in skilled occupations, which in turn had lasting effects on fertility and intergenerational transmission of labor market norms. These findings contribute to understanding how historical shocks can generate persistent changes in gender roles and economic behavior.

INPS internal seminar, INPS workshop on Gender Economics, Rome, December 2024.

Social Class and Economic Policy Enactment among Municipal Executives , with Ari Ray

Does the social class of a politician influence their economic policy choices? Leveraging a close elections RDD design, we examine whether electing a lower-middle class mayor, compared to an upper-middle-classcounterfactual, affectsthecompositionofmunicipalbudgets. FocusingonItaly, where electoral rules grant mayors considerable policy discretion yet fiscal room to maneuver is limited, we analyze local revenue streams, tax instruments, expenditure aggregates and functional spending. Consistent with theories linking descriptive and substantive representation, we find that economic policy becomes more redistributive when mayors from lower social classes hold office. Specifically, they (a) raise tax rates on property ownership, while introducing progressive elements to the tax structure; (b) reduce efforts to collect revenues from socially regressive fees and fines, (c) preserve consumption-oriented current spending, (d) cut dow non bureaucratic costs, and (e) prioritize spending on educational support services. Overall, findings suggest that the numerical under representation of lower social classes in government may limit the extent to which redistributive policies are enacted.

University of Geneva, EPSA conference Madrid 2025.